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Liberal: Reply 
Amartya Sen 
University  of  Delhi 
Professors Hillinger and Lapham's critique of my theorem on the impos- 
sibility of combining Conditions P  (Pareto principle), L (liberalism), and 
U  (unrestricted domain) does not question the validity  of  the  theorem 
but denies that my definition of  Condition L corresponds to  the correct 
notion of liberalism. When writing my paper, I  was afraid of definitional 
disputes, and after claiming that "Condition L represents a value involv- 
ing individual liberty that many people would subscribe to"  (a  sentence 
that Hillinger and Lapham quote), I added that "whether such people are 
best described as liberals is a question that is not crucial to the point of 
the paper" (a sentence that they do not quote). However, while the valid- 
ity  of the theorem is not in dispute, its practical importance will depend 
on the exact interpretation of liberalism; and, hence, Hillinger and Lap- 
ham are within their rights to question my definition of Condition L. 
The alternative interpretation  of liberalism on which Hillinger and Lap- 
ham (henceforth, HL)  base their paper, and which they claim to be "the 
only generally accepted principle of liberalism," is nowhere precisely de- 
fined by HL. It is only "broadly defined" (to quote their expression) in 
highly general terms, but  they  do  spell out  its  implications fairly pre- 
cisely.'  It  appears  from  their  definition  that,  whenever interpersonal 
interdependences are  present,  the  principle  of  liberalism  would  not 
assert  anything. "Whenever the  choices of  one  individual  impinge on 
the welfare of others there is no general presumption  in favour of freedom 
of  individual choice," and  HL  "are aware of  no  relatively value  free 
principle of liberalism  which could decide the issue in such a case" (p. 2).2 
Liberalism, on this interpretation, would seem to demand freedom of  in- 
dividual action only when a person's action is not opposed by anyone else. 
It  is clear why the principle of liberalism, thus defined, will not conflict 
with the Pareto principle: because it does not demand anything that the 
1 HL  are also quite  precise in  quoting  my  views,  although  frequently  this  precision 
is  not  matched  by  accuracy.  For  example,  I  neither  hold  nor  have  I  stated  or  im- 
plied, as alleged by HL, that  "liberal principles imply  that  it is worse to  force person  1 
to  read a book  he does  not  want  to  read than it  is to  prevent  person 2  from  reading 
a  book  he does  wish  to  read" (p.  3). 
2 Why  should  the  principle  of  liberalism,  which  should  give  expression  to  liberal 
values, be expected to be "value free" is, however, not explained. 
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Pareto principle does not also demand.3  Indeed, HL show not merely that 
their brand of liberalism  is consistent with the Pareto principle, they show 
in  effect  that  liberalism  (according to  their  definition)  is  completely 
redundant in the presence of the Pareto principle. 
Is this really "the only generally accepted principle of liberalism"? The 
Pareto principle is  generally taken to  be  noncontroversial. By  the  HL 
interpretation,  liberalism does not demand anything more and so must be 
also noncontroversial.  Then what does the liberal assert? A typical prob- 
lem of liberalism would arise, I imagine, when a person wants to do some- 
thing  (for  example, read a  book, wear a  dress, or express some views) 
which some others  (maybe  a  majority or  even  everybody else)  think 
should not be done. But not so in the views of HL. Since the action in 
question will "impinge on the welfare" of other persons, the principle of 
liberalism, as seen by them, could not possibly apply here. "In conditions 
of  interdependence, we cannot," say  HL,  "conceive of  any  'principle of 
liberalism' which would govern what actions are to be left to individuals, 
independently of  the  majority preference of  the  individuals concerned" 
(p. 3).  Liberalism, on this interpretation, would say nothing on minority 
rights, nothing on the  right to  privacy, and nothing on  noninterference 
in personal lives. It  would defend a person's freedom of  action only  so 
long as nobody else objects to that action. 
I  would readily concede that my  theorem asserted nothing about this 
empty box which HL call liberalism. This is, in fact, not a concession, it 
is an assertion. 
3 The  modification  of  my  illustration  with  which  HL  conclude  their paper is  based 
on  a confusion  between  (1)  a  condition  on the  functional  relation between  individual 
preferences and social  choice,  and  (2)  a  specification  of  an  arbitrary social  ordering, 
irrespective  of  the  individual  preferences.  Conditions  L  and  P,  in  my  paper,  are 
conditions  in  the  former  sense,  whereas  HL's  "less  bloody  action  should  always  be 
preferred" is  an  example  of  the  latter. 